have admirably summed up what we know about how large U.S. corporations have been governed in he past 20 years. As such, I do not have many quibbles with their story. Instead, I would like to argue that the era of shareholder value has now come to a close. This is for two reasons. Flrst. and nlost importantly, the methods and practices of financial engineering Dobbin and Zorn describe, have reached an endpoint in their ability to make corporations more profitable. The recent stock market crash is at ieast in part a resulr of investors becoming convinced that firrns could not sus~ain the upward profit path. Second, the financial scandals of he early 19XOc show the limits of these tactics. Firms like Enron and Worldcum were aggressively piirsuing exotic forms of financial engineering with the help of their accountants and the 1i)rbearance of financial atlalysts.
The case for my argument is based on the theoretical view-that in any g~ven era, there are a set of shared strategies or ractlcs that produce profits for the larges~ corporations. These strategies arc based on a common understanding amongst managers and owners about "what works" to make money. I have ca1lzd these understandings "conceptions of control" (Fligstein, 2001 ). These strategies come into extstence, spread acroqs the population of large corporations. and are eventually displaced as they inev~tably Lil to continue to work as economic conditions c h a~~g r .
This has happened in cycles of -20-2 years for the past 100 years. Political and economic crises such as war. depression, or slow economic growth erode the position of the largest firms. Under these conditinnh. the old tactics fail and this opens up the possibility for a new group of owners and managers to slep forward and produce a new path. These new groups are often outsiders who unme along and reorganize the way things work. They begin by growing new or existing firms in some spectacular fashion. Once their tactics are understood, there is often a merger movement that pushes the spread o f these tactics across firms. At the end. there is often a recession or depression often accompanied by rl long bearish stock market. Then the cycle begins aneav.
We have had a succession of these tactics in the past 100 years in America (Fl~gstein, 19901. During the 1950 . the dominant view was that the large corporaticln should operate like a capital market. It should have many kinds of products and investments were made to smooth out business cycles.
Firms bought and sold other firms In order to exit slow growing businesses and entcr fast-growing ones. The extreme form of this approach was the emergence of large conglomerates, which used mergers to grow during the merger movemcnt of the 1960s. That merger movement ended in 1969 and the 1970s witnessed an economic crisis caused mostly by the oil shocks. This crisis produced a decade characterized by slow economic growth and high inflauon. These were conditions that eventually inspired some managers and owners to begin lo look for a new way lo make profits.
Tn the 1970s. the dorninan~ view of corporalr managers was that they needed to adjust to the poor economic environment by trying to rnakz themselves less vulnerable to high interest rates, high inflation, and slow econnmic growth. They dtd so by a v t~i d i~~g borrowing and they kept cash on hand to finance their g r~w t h .
As physical assets (like plants and equ~pments) were inflating in value, managers tended not to revalue them on them hooks. Since many of the measures of firm financial performance were based on returns on assets. revaluing assets made their financial performance look worse The stock markel drifted through the 1970s as investors stayed away from stocks and instead invested in bonds which had high yields.
The poor, performance of firms brought about a critique of sitting management reams around 1 980. Th ilse doing the blaming. not surprisingly.
were the representatives of the financial community: institu~ionat investors, stock ~nalysts, and investment hanks. These groups argued that managers w-ere not paying enough attention to shareholder's interest. They felt that managers were not using their assets effectively to earn profits and that this explained firms' poor perforn~ance on the stock marker. They wanled managers tn concentrate on raising pratits and thereby rising he stock price. By 1980. man! managers found hat, given the inflated value of their assets anit their lack of debt and large hoards of cash, their tirnls' stock prices wtre so low that their firms were worth more broken up than as a single entity.
The 1 980s and t 990s produced several wakes of financial reorganization of Plmerican corporations. In the first merger wave from 1979 to 1987, firms were either broken up or unprofitable capscity was shut down. This produced the deindustrialization of America. Manager1 realized that if they wanted t o S~P V in control of their firms, they needed to work with the newly mobilized financial cornmunily, learn to talk their talk. and makc their firms look attractive to investors. Managers who avoided being tnrgtts did so by enga~ing in mergers thttnselves. spinning off unprofitable businesses, and gilt hering debt. The "shareholder value concep~ion of control" that Dobbin and Zorn describe focused managerial attention on making balance sheets look good to financial analysts in order lo encourage them to reconlmend the slock and thus. enhance, sharehrhder value.
This created huge incentives to engage in financial engineering and to discover how lo rnanipulale halance sheets to get r~d of assets and hide any liabilities that might make mtios such as return on capital look bad. .4s Dobbin and Zorn note, the natural heirs to power in the firm were the chief financial officers tCFOs). Before 19110. CFOs were often little more than accountants or treasurers who played l~ttle role in corporate strategy. But as the era of Gnancialization took off, they were the peoplz who could claim to speak to t l~r financial community. By the late 1980s. the relationships between bnards of directors, CEOs. CFOs, institutional investors. stock analysts, and the large accountinp firms had al~cred. Accounting firms werc nffering firms adtire on how to make their balance sheets look better while financial analysts were telling CFOs how they wanted their books to looh. CFOs f~l l o w e d their proscr~l~tions and engineered the hooks to produce higher profits for the firms. Boards of directors wanted to be responsive to shareholder Interests and it' the stock prlce perked up as zi result of using financial tactics, they could claim they werc performing their fiduciary responsibility. Managers who focused on stock prices and balance sheets were seen as heroes.
1 would like to make the case that the great expansJon of shareholder value has reached its endpornt. As I noled earlier, new conceptiorls of control emerge about every 1(&25 years. The shareholder value conception of conircbl has existed for just about that long. New conceptions of control often appear during a merger movement. This is because a merger moverrlent reflects a reshuffling or corporate assets In line with some new conception of how firms ought lo look. The shareholder value conception of control began with the merger movement from 1979 lo 1987. The end of a cycle rs often indica~ed by a stock market downturn, which often proceeds or even cauqej a recesaon. Markets crash when profit expectations for a particular way oi doing business ends. Markets often are prescient In their predictinn of econonlic downturn. because the end of a hull market means people expect there to be slower economic growth in the future. The stock market crash in 2000 was an event at least partially caused by the end of shareholder value. There were. quite simply. unsusta~nable expect3 tions over the fulure of corporate profits. One of the reasons lhal this occurred was because firms ran out of creative ways to do financial engineering and this fi~ilure signaled the onset of a market downtur~l. Not surprisingly. this downturn has been arcompanled by an economic recession.
To make matters worst, the crash of the stock market was accorrlpanied by the revelation that financial analysl~. CFOs, boards of directors, and audllnrs had frequently engaged in distorling firms' financial pcrformnnces in order to boost stock prices. Thr people who pushed the financial envelope hcre did so precisely because they had exhausted the easiest ways to make their balance sheets look better. In pursuil of higher gains, they turned to ploys h a t were illegal. This resulkd in some spectacular firm failures and a new piece of legislation, the Oxlcy Sarhanes Act. Before turning to the Oxlry-Sarbanes Act. it is useful to consider the type ol'lhing that firms who were pushing the financia! envelope were doing that was illegal. It is instructive to consider the case of Enron who engaged in complex financial arrangcments in their atlelnpt to maximize sharehoidcr value.
Enron was on !he leading edge of financially oriented corporations that viewed themselves as pr~marily in i he business OF creating shareholder value b) raising the stock price of the firm. Enron is a case of the shareholder value corporation run amuck. It is uscful to describe some of what Enron was doing in some detail because it gives us a flavor of the kinds of thin_rs that financially oriented managers were d o~n g in many compnies. Onr or the main measures that firms use to evaluate performance is return on assets (calculated as earnings/assets). Now there are two ways to make this number b~pger: make earnings higher or make assets lower. Financiall) orien tzd managers figured o u~ that taking assets off the hooks could make firms Io~lk better. They could do this in several ways, First. they ccluld lease assets like machines, office space, or facto ties. These c o~t s would then be expenses which ~vould not figure into a w l s and thus could help their returns o n assets.
But financially oriented managers discovered another way to take assets off the books without having to sell lhe~n off entirely. They could spin assets off itito subsidiaries and then sell off part of the subsidiary la another firnl. This would allow lhem to buok part of the sale of assets as sales and hence have 11 directly help earnings. Another effect of doing this was also to allow firms to lake all of those assels off their books because they no longer owned them entirely. Inslead, they owned part of the subsidiary. This wo~tld affect the ratio described above by reducing asset&. This ploy allowed ~h r firms to play another lucrative game. They would pay money to the suhsidia:y for u e o f those assels (thereby providing money to their partner for their invzctment). They could then use that payment in two ways that helped the balance sheet. Part of the money the paid to use the asszts would come back to the main firm in the form of profits Ernm the subsidiary {the suhsidiary sold the use of the assets to ~h z firm and it was able t o report s profit from that activity). The money could also be booked as a cost Tram the point of view of the main firm. Thus. a finn could afrecr its earningr by simply paying itself moncy rt already had and sirnultaneouslg making s profit from the subsidiary and subtractitig an expcnse. This ploy would affect both assets and earnings and thus make the ratio rise. Financial analysts observing such ratins would then recommend the stock and the share price would rise. Now, if the reader has followed this discussion, [hey will be astonished that all of this is legal. Hut it is. What Enron did wss to push the envelope on deals like this (as well as a nutnber of other financially oriented activities) by creating a number of these vehicles that were embedded In one another to create a kind of' pyramid scheme. While Ihe executives at Enron used these vehides in illegal ways. those practices lhat were legal were widespr,ead amongst :\~ncrican corporations.
The The end of thc bull market driven by firms attempting to maximize shareholder value through financializntion and the sealing ol that md by the Oxley-Sarbanes Act. suggests u-e are enlerlng a new era for firms. Not surprisingly, the past 4 years have produced ci shallow recovery in spite of the government running huge hadget defic~ts and the Federal Reserve keeping interest rates extremely low. The basic problem is that firms lack a clear set of tactics to renew the economy If we are trying to decipher what those new tactics might be, it is useful to consider the past. l t often took 5-1 0 years for new tactics to emerge. These tactics frequently came from outside the established core of business. And finally. one looks to find fast growing firms with a new way of doing business to see how money will he made. I n the new economy, circa 1998, one might have bet on software snd information technologies or biotechnology for showing the new way. Bur, the spectacular failure of the technology sector and the slow progress ot' biotechnology to produce useful products, suggests these are not the paths to the new future. A more promising set of tactics is the hollowr r~g out of firms through supply chain management. outsourcing, partnenng. just in lime inventories, and the extensive use of cornpuler kchnology to manasc ilatter firms faster. Companies like Wal Mart esernplify thcse tactics. These are gains that create new businesses (i.e. businesses to teach and help tirnls attain these gains) and can be generalized across B w~d e sector of industry. But these tactics do not so far seem 10 have produced spectacular growth rates (with the exception of a few firms).
The Plmerican economy is huge and awtuomely diversified across products and geugmph~c space. That some sets of firms will eventually figure out a ncw way 10 do business seems likely. The dynamism i s thcrt.. What seems evident is that the shareholder value focus on stock prices and financial engineering seem to have run out of steam. What will follow is rl~lyone's guess.
